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BRAZIL INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN 








 “Somos primos de verdade”, President Lula declared during a diplomatic trip to 
Lebanon in 2003 (ANBA, 5/12/03)
i
. Such an expression may seem striking to anyone 
who is familiar with the Mediterranean region and its global context. The following 
paper questions the perception of European Union (EU) dominance in the 
Mediterranean region amidst the outbreak of new actors and emerging states. Thus far, 
Brazil has drawn less attention, but the connection between this South American giant 
and its non-European Mediterranean partners shall not be overlooked
ii
. Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva‟s election as president on 1
st
 January 2003 gave Brazil an unprecedented 
international boost. Brazilian governments have always presented international 
ambitions that have been hindered by economic ups and downs
iii
. 
Now counted among the world‟s ten leading economies and boasting 8.5 million 
km
2
 and 192 million inhabitants in 2008, Brazil is considered an emerging power
iv
. 
Lula‟s government has also developed an extremely active diplomacy, starting strong in 
creating the commercial G-20 within the World Trade Organization (WTO)
v
. Brazil‟s 
international strategy aims to increase the country‟s visibility, make its positions heard 
by the traditional powers, and hence legitimize its ambitions to participate in 
multilateral arenas. Furthermore, foreign policy appears as a means of development in 
Brazil, one of the most unequal states in the world. Subsequently, Brazilian diplomatic 
activism does not bypass the countries skirting the Mediterranean Sea. 
Brazilian diplomacy does not have a global Mediterranean approach of the 
region, because those countries are dealt with as different geographical areas by 
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. They are split between divisions dedicated to Africa, the Middle East and 
Europe
vii
. However, Arab countries are often included together with those from the 
Arabic peninsula in official work papers. For the purpose of this analysis, a 
geographical logic will also be adopted, including the following partners: Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, the Palestinian territories, Tunisia and 
Turkey. Henceforth, how should the Brazilian emergence on the southern and eastern 
shores of the Mediterranean be understood and analysed? First, there is no denying that 
bounds between Brazil and this part of the Mediterranean region are nothing new. 
Nevertheless, a real boost has occurred at the turn of the century, for economic as well 
as diplomatic motivations. 
 
A revived socio-historical legacy 
Brazil developed links with non-European Mediterranean countries long ago, 
first through migration. Over 12 million Syro-Lebanese descendants currently live in 
Brazil, comprising the largest Arab community outside of the Middle East. The number 
of Syro-Lebanese descendants living in Brazil is even larger than the population 
numbers of their origin countries! Brazil also hosts the second largest Latin American 
Jewish community, following Argentina and representing 120,000 people
viii
. Syro-
Lebanese descendants are active members of Brazilian society, especially within 
political spheres, and President Lula always recalls this fact in his travels to those 
Mediterranean countries. 
Brazil‟s political and diplomatic relations with Mediterranean countries date 
back to 1858 and an agreement signed with the Ottoman Empire
ix
. Brazil and Egypt, in 
particular, initiated relations during the British protectorate era. Emperor Don Pedro II, 
an admirer of Arab culture, travelled to the region in 1871 and 1876. Since the 1950s, 




Relationships between Brazil and its Arab partners accelerated following the 
first oil crisis. Though Brazil assented to the partition of Palestine in its vote for UN 
Resolution 181 in November 1947, its oil dependency later encouraged a more pro-Arab 
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. Arab pressures affected Brazil‟s „equidistance‟ policy after 1973. Brazil 
needed to import quantities of oil to ensure its internal development, within its program 
of import substitution industrialization. For example, 40% of Brazil‟s imported oil in 
1980 came from Iraq (FARES, 2007). As a consequence, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (POL) opened an office in Brazil in 1975, and in November of the same 
year, Brazil voted at the General Assembly of the United Nations for a resolution 
assimilating Zionism as a form of racism. Since taking interest in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, Brazil has defended the implementation of the UN Resolution 242 (1967), 
voted into action following the Six-Day War (SANTOS, 2003). As also proven by the 
visit of President Figueiredo to Algeria in November 1983, Brazilian presence in the 
Mediterranean region challenges the vision of an almost exclusive historical European 
presence, although it still remains relatively limited. 
Nevertheless, relations between Brazil and non-European Mediterranean 
countries weakened following the decrease of oil prices, the return of democracy and 
the emergence of economic crisis in Brazil, and subsequent diminished Brazilian efforts 
for diplomacy. For instance, the office of the Arab League was closed down, an air 
route between São Paulo and Beirut was cancelled three years after its launch in 1995 
for lack of demand, and a programmed visit of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2002) to the Palestinian territories was postponed without any outcome 
(MAJZOUB, 2001; ANBA, 17/02/04). The former leader Cardoso acknowledges it in 
his memories: “The Middle East that was important during the military governments, 
was losing relevance, given the high degree of conflict established in the region and our 
lack of means to intervene constructively” (CARDOSO, 2006, p.612). During his two 
mandates, Brazil moved further and further away from the Mediterranean countries. 
Closing embassies and coming back to a cautious rhetoric concerning the Middle East, 
the nation was approaching a certain alignment on Northern American positions at the 
Security Council (MESSARI, 2006). 
Yet, historical events are not entirely dichotomous; to some extent, an evolution 
had started to dawn by the end of the nineties. Itamaraty organized a conference on the 
Arab world in Brasilia in 2000. Likewise, relations with Turkey remained relatively 
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constant though few developed. In September 1999, the Brazilian embassy established 
in Tunis in 1961 was closed for financial reasons and then reactivated in July 2001. The 
Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia came to Brazil the next year to sign two 
agreements in the field of cooperation
xii
. Those documents will be used as a foundation 
for future projects developed between the two countries. Even if inconsistent, any 
legacy becomes important when countries decide to boost their relations, as has been the 
case since 2003. 
 
Taking the offensive: the arrival of President Lula 
During his inaugural address, President Lula announced a new deal concerning 
foreign policy, a change that resulted partly in the reinforcement of the South-South 
diplomacy. Concerning Middle Eastern and North African countries, Brazilian 
diplomacy drew attention at two key moments. In 2003 he made his first-ever 
diplomatic tour in the region, and 2005 organized the first Southern America – Arab 
countries Summit (known as ASPA) in Brasilia. Since 2008, Brazil has shown stronger 
effort to get back in contact with the region, and these efforts are noted more 
particularly through the mutual diplomatic visits of the Israeli, Palestinian, and Brazilian 
leaders between the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010. On the whole, the Brazilian 
president has visited eight non-European Mediterranean countries and received in return 
six of his counterparts. No Brazilian travel of such a scale took place under Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso‟s mandate
xiii
. Except for Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon, all of President 
Lula‟s diplomatic visits have been firsts in Brazilian history
xiv
. The Middle Eastern 
diplomatic tour during December 2003 had an important impact, representing the first 
official venue of a Brazilian head of state in the region in 127 years. Moreover, at the 
end of 2002, Brazil was admitted as observatory from the Council to the Arab League, 
and Lula da Silva became the first Brazilian head of state invited to address a speech at 
its tribune in December 2003. In return, the Arab League reopened its mission in 
Brasilia in April 2007 (ANBA, 24/04/07). So, there is definitely a real political will 
from Brazil to strengthen its presence in the Mediterranean region. 
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It is nevertheless necessary to clarify that this region is not a priority objective in 
Brazilian South-South diplomacy. President Lula devoted more time to South America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa
xv
. Official development assistance is a telling example. Brazil 
has appeared as one of the new donors in the field of international cooperation, though 
its contributions remain far smaller than those of China (SCHLAGER, 2007). Brazil‟s 
orientation is clear: Africa represents more than half of its activities. According to a 
report from the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) published in 2007, Cape 
Verde (with 19.52%), Guinea-Bissau (with 18.06%), and Mozambique (17.15%) are the 
main beneficiaries of development assistance, versus only 1.51% for Morocco, 0.83% 
for Tunisia, 0.22% for Algeria and 0.07% for Egypt. Lebanon gets 1.37% of the 
assistance for Asia (mainly attributed to Timor-Leste) (ABC, 2007). On-going projects 
apply to a wide range of items, including medical activities (Algeria), agriculture 
(Algeria, Tunisia), and professional trainings (Algeria, Morocco) (ABC, 2009). As 
mentioned in the introduction, the Mediterranean region does not exist as itself in the 
eyes of Brazilian diplomacy, as proven by the fact that it both participates in the ASPA 
(South America-Arab countries) process and ASA (Africa-South America) process. 
Held in Brasilia in May 2005, the ASPA Summit shapes the background to 
Brazil‟s relations with Arab countries
xvi
. It was set up on President Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva‟s initiative and epitomizes the most important international event that was 
presided jointly by the Brazilian head of the state and its Algerian counterpart Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika. It was the first meeting in history to gather states from these two regions and 
strive for their rapprochement. Regular monitoring meetings enabled continuous contact 
between these countries and broadened their mutual knowledge. Though a multilateral 
organization, its achievements are materialized on a bilateral level. In the social sphere 
for instance, Brazil presented its Bolsa Familia
xvii
 program during the first thematic 
ASPA meeting held at the head office of the Arab League in 2007. 
Agreements with Egypt and Lebanon have since been signed (ANBA, 
30/04/07a, 17/08/07, 12/03/09). Other partners like Morocco and the Palestinian 
territories have since expressed interest in exchange with Brazil (ANBA, 30/04/07b, 
2/03/10). 
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Relationships are not homogenous among those countries. Egypt represents a 
special interlocutor as it is the Arab country with the biggest population, a long and 
reputable diplomatic tradition, and a key role in the Arab world. Brazilian diplomats 
regard Egypt as a kind of “equivalent” counterpart. Surprisingly, Turkey, another 
emerging nation, did not overtake Brazilian relations, though it has been catching up 
since 2008. From political rapprochement to collaborative projects, a variety of 
motivations guide diplomacy. In the case of Brazil‟s diplomacy with non-European 
Mediterranean countries, these motivations are generated both by a trade logic and a 
diplomatic ambition. 
 
A still unexploited economic potential 
Links between Brazil and the Mediterranean region stem from an economic 
necessity. Foreign policy is fully part of the Brazilian strategy for development, as it 
partly bets on an economy drawn by exportations, till the internal market gets stronger. 
Moreover, trade is a good first step to establish contacts between countries that do not 
know each other very well politically. President Lula always brings business men on his 
diplomatic trips (Le Figaro, 4/12/03). In December 2003, he travelled to the Middle 
East with around fifty entrepreneurs. The ASPA Summit in Brasilia also appeared as an 
opportunity to boost interregional trade. Outside the meeting, Brazil consequently 
organized a fair gathering around 1,200 entrepreneurs - 250 from Arab countries, 300 
from South America and 650 from Brazil (Le Nouvel Observateur, 05/05). 
The incentives to interregional trade development also take other forms. Within 
the Mercosur, two projects aiming at liberalizing trade of goods are under negotiation 
with Morocco (2004) and Turkey (2008)
xviii
. The Agreement with Egypt, under 
discussions since 2004, was signed in 2010. In addition, the Brazilian government has 
organized many commercial missions in non-European Mediterranean countries 
(ANBA, 12/04/10, 15/04/10b). The latest mission took place in April 2010 in Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Iran, and was organized by the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
External Trade (MDIC). Eighty-six Brazilian entrepreneurs took part in this event. 
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The outcome of this diplomatic effort was a dramatic increase of trade, though 
the upsurge was not solely due to political visits. Trade between Brazil and Arab 
countries (including the Middle East) increased by 167% between 2003 and 2009 
(ANBA, 25/03/10). Likewise, the trade volume between Brazil and Turkey skyrocketed 
by 192% between 2003 and 2008 to reach US$ 1.2 billion (Itamaraty bulletin n°211, 
2010). With Israel, Brazilian trade increased from US$ 440 million to US$ 1.6 billion 
during the same period. Southern- and Eastern-Mediterranean countries played a large 
role in diversifying Brazil‟s trade partners. 
Primary Brazilian multinational companies have their own international strategy 
but also benefit from the diplomatic efforts deployed by Lula‟s government. Hence the 
joint-venture between the Brazilian company Randon and the Algerian Cevital for the 
installation of an assembly line for vehicles (ANBA, 10/02/06). The same Brazilian 
company has just signed a similar agreement with its Egyptian counterpart Egypt Power 
(ANBA, 14/04/10a). Other companies are already settling on this market, taking part in 
the rise of Brazilian visibility in the region. For instance, the Norberto Odebrecht S.A. 
participates in the enlargement of the international airport of Tripoli and in the 
construction of the third beltway around the Libyan capital (ANBA, 17/02/09). 
However, the economic importance of the non-European Mediterranean 
countries still remains relatively slight. The trade potential between Brazil and member 
states of the Arab League was estimated to reach US$ 60 billion in 2008 but only 
reached US$ 19 billion (COSTA, 2008). Brazilian exports to the member states of the 
Arab League represented only 4.9% of the 2008 international sales of Brazilian 
products, and the imports from those partners represented 6.1% of Brazil‟s global 
imports
xix
. Moreover, from the Arab League, Brazil‟s main trade partners are Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, not the Mediterranean countries. The world 
financial and economic crisis impacted those relations; even if Brazilian exports have 
increased from US$ 9.4 to US$ 9.8 billion, imports from member states of the Arab 
League have decreased from around US$ 10 to US$ 5 billion. This drop can more 
particularly be explained by the decrease of oil prices, given that oil represents almost 
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Brazilian exports are also very condensed: meat and auxiliary products represent 
28% of the 2008 total exports, and sugar and confectionery 18%
xxi
. So, the agricultural 
question is crucial in Brazil‟s commercial strategy towards Arab countries. Brazil is 
sometimes depicted as the world‟s farm: in addition to its Amazonian forest, it ranks 
third worldwide for its agriculture and first for its ethanol production, cane sugar, 
coffee, tropical fruits, and beef herd. Forty per cent of chicken sold in the world comes 
from Brazil (ANBA, 4/03/10). The food processing industry represents 32% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 38% of its exports, and 28% of its employment in 2005 
(KIMITO, 2005). For their part, Southern- and Eastern-Mediterranean countries are 
often showing a strong shortfall in agricultural products (ABIS, NARDONE, 2009). 
Brazilian food exports to Arab countries have increased by 25.1% in early 2010 from 
the first semester in 2009 and compared to a general 15% increase of the sector (ANBA, 
14/04/10b). Between 2000 and 2005, Brazilian food exports to Egypt and Algeria 
boomed by 239% and 825%, respectively! Consequently, Brazil now dominates some 
sectors in those countries, namely, representing 99.83% of Egyptian purchases of sugar 
and 91% of imported meat in this country. Egypt has become the second main buyer of 
sugar and beef already from 2002 (ANBA, 6/11/03), hence the diplomatic importance 
this country is granted. 
The agricultural issues between Brazil and Mediterranean countries are not 
limited to trade. Brazil seeks indeed to develop cooperation projects in this field in order 
to improve its own production. The Brazilian Institute for food research, Embrapa, plays 
a key role in this purpose, as it is in charge of all Brazilian breakthroughs in this sector. 
It not only takes part in training individuals from partner countries, but also sets up 
exchanges aiming at diversifying its own research and studies. For instance, Embrapa 
signed an agreement with Syria to import animals that would adapt to the semiarid 
territory of Brazilian Nordeste (ANBA, 12/11/03). Accordingly, a project of wheat seed 
exchanges with Tunisia was launched in the end of November 2008 (Bulletin of 
Embrapa, 6/11/08). Brazil is not currently a big wheat producer because the cereal is 
poorly adapted to Brazilian climate and soils. 
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Brazil and Mediterranean countries are not mutual priorities to each other, and 
President Lula has attempted to improve this situation. Choosing economy might be a 
good start, but, as Brazilian researcher Nizar Messari stresses, entering Middle Eastern 
issues remains a challenge (MESSARI, 2005). 
 
A new arbitrator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? 
Brazil‟s international emergence and visibility have resulted from strong 
diplomatic activism, including the interest shown in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that 
proves Brazil‟s readiness to take responsibilities on the international scene. This 
orientation may also be a key to understand why Egypt raised more interest than 
Turkey
xxii
. According to Carlos Santana, Brazil before Lula did not consider itself as a 
power able to bring any decisive contribution in the Middle East (SANTANA, 2005). 
On the contrary, at the time of his inaugural address, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared 
that his objective would be change through dialogue and negotiation. Brazil appears 
then as a new alternative advocating peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The South 
American giant claims that no resolution to the conflict would be possible without 
political concession and, consequently, offers to help in negotiations. It draws on an 
experimented and reconciliatory diplomacy. British academic Andrew Hurrell portrays 
Brazilian strategy as soft balancing, putting the emphasis on cooperation, dialogue and 
collaboration with all international partners (HURRELL, 2006). 
Moreover, the Brazilian administration points out its socio-historical links with 
the Middle East to legitimize its rapprochement and give it credibility, as both 
communities live together pacifically and tolerantly in Brazilian territory. President 
Lula has declared: “Our diversity allows us to promote dialogue between civilizations” 
(Arabies, 04/06). Historically, Brazil has always defined its positions following the 
resolutions voted at the UN, resolution 242 of 1967 being its reference. Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva was personally involved in the question, since he met Shimon Peres in Israel in 
1993, and Yasser Arafat in Tunisia the next year, as president of the Worker‟s Party. 
The current Brazilian government aligns with the diplomatic tradition of its 
country by linking itself to the decisions taken at the multilateral level. However, 
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something new lies in its will to take a larger part in the peace negotiations (Itamaraty 
bulletin n°627, n°724, 2008; n°10, n°24, n°41, 2009; n°119, n°130, 2010). With this 
aim, Brazil defends both Israel‟s right to live in peace in internationally recognized 
borders and the establishment of an independent, democratic and economically viable 
Palestinian state in the Territories occupied since 1967. Concerning Palestinian 
refugees, Brazil is in favour of creating a financial compensation system and advocates 
Jerusalem being shared between the parties. Brazil refuses to define the conflict in the 
Middle East as an issue of religion or civilization, but considers it rather as a mix of 
nationalism and economic factors
xxiii
. A quote from the Brazilian Minister of External 
Relations, Celso Amorim, embodies clearly the Brazilian position: 
I think it is natural that Brazil has interest in participating in the questions linked 
to the Middle-East, because they concern world peace. And if they concern peace in the 
world, we are of course also concerned. Not to mention the number of Arab descendants 
living in Brazil. We are not to appear with a brand new solution for the Middle-East 
issue. All possible solutions have already been proposed. What is necessary is the 
political will to implement them. In our position we would like to contribute to 
dialogue. I think that a country such as Brazil can easily achieve this. Owing to our own 
history or to the history Brazil has with this region. Owing to the respect Brazil 
internationally inspires. We do not want to make it alone, but by getting together with 
other actors. (…) The truth is that limiting dialogue to the „Quartet‟ has not been 
successful. So, I believe it is necessary to have more representativeness in the 
international community (ANBA, 30/12/09). 
Moreover, Brazil is not affected by historical nor political connotations like 
those of the United States or the European Union and even benefits from a rather good 
image in the Middle East (ACHCAR, 2005; ANBA, 12/02/10, 17/03/10). Indeed, few 
are the countries that do not have any strategic interest in the region. 
Nevertheless, this positive image is not always reflected at the internal level. 
Brazilian foreign policy towards Arab countries was one of the points in Lula‟s 
government‟s diplomacy that endured the sharpest criticism by the opposition like the 
Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) (MESSARI, 2006, ALBUQUERQUE, 
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2007). It was namely reproached for too obviously showing its preference for 
Palestinians to the detriment of relations with Israel. De facto, during his trip in 
December 2003, the Brazilian president did not go to Israel. The Brasilia Declaration 
closing the 2005 ASPA Summit also stood up for the Palestinian cause, even giving rise 
to remarks from the Embassy of Israel in Brasilia. Following the Summit, Minister 
Celso Amorim was quickly sent to the scene on 28 May 2005 to reassert the traditional 
Brazilian position. President Lula summarizes his position himself: “I was born in 
Brazilian politics defending the Palestinian state, but never did I deny the necessity of 
the state of Israel either”
xxiv
. Therein lies the very strength of Brazilian diplomacy: it 
does not conceal its slight favour toward Palestinians and does so without appearing 
anti-Israeli. The question concerning the longevity of this difficult balancing position 
remains but Itamaraty is famous for historically finding balances. For the time being, 
Brazil sets out to maintain good relationships with all different parties. Hence many 
bilateral visits with Israel and a cooperation agreement in the field of research and 
development that both countries signed in February 2007. During the same year, 
Mercosur also ratified an agreement for trade liberalization with Israel, which came into 
force in Brazil at the end of April 2010
xxv
. As another confirmation for this friendly 
bilateral relationship, the Israeli President has proposed helping Brazil in the 
organization of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio (El País, 17/11/09). Also, Brazil 
recently agreed to recognize the existence of a Palestinian State along the 1967 borders, 
showing a will to pursue its strategy (Itamaraty Bulletin n°707, 2010). 
Lately, Brazil‟s emergence in this Middle Eastern conflict seems a sudden 
development, but rather, is probably the only outcome of a long process of involvement 
since President Lula came into power. As early as 2004, Brazil showed its intention by 
creating a position of Special Ambassador for the Middle East at Itamaraty, as well as a 
representation office in Ramallah. Minister Celso Amorim went to Israel and through 
the Palestinian territories in 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010
xxvi
. In 2005, Brazil, together 
with its Indian and South-African partners, informed the Quartet
xxvii
 of their wish to get 
more involved. Symbolically, the three countries composing the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
announced the joint funding for the creation of a sport centre in Ramallah, and its 
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construction began in April 2009. Brazil is also a part of the very conferences on this 
file: Paris and Annapolis in 2007 and Egypt in 2009 (ANBA, 26/07/04, 24/01/07)
xxviii
. 
Another facet of the Brazilian activism is the aid to the Palestinians, as relative 
as it might be. Brazil has hosted 108 Palestinian refugees in 2007 in collaboration with 
the UN (ANBA, 10/10/07). It has also donated several times as major crises occurred in 
the Palestinian territories: donation of US$ 500.000 in 2006, shipment of medicine in 
December 2008, 14 tons of medicine and 8 tons of food for the Gaza Strip in January 
2009, project of donation of US$ 10 million approved by the parliament in March 2010 
(Itamaraty bulletin n°726, 2008; n°4, 2009; ANBA, 12/03/10). 
Finally, official visits that have occurred since November 2009 are the crowning 
achievement of background work developed by Brazil for several years in order to 
appear as a potential contact in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Within nine days, 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders went to Brazil and both thanked Brazilian willingness to 
get involved in the negotiations
xxix
. Reciprocally, President Lula travelled to the Middle 
East in April 2010
xxx
, thereby confirming the region‟s new status in international 
foreign affairs. Brazil is moreover establishing closer and closer relationships with other 
essential partners in the Israeli-Palestinian case, such as Egypt. It is also forming closer 
ties with Jordan, visited in April 2010, and Syria, where Minister Celso Amorim was 
sent following the meetings held during the presidential visit (ANBA, 18/03/10). The 
main idea remains the same: bring all the parties together to negotiate around a common 
table, from the (more) moderate to the (more) radical (including, according to some in 
Brazil, the Hamas).  
Brazil gave one more boost to its insertion in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process by organizing a meeting between the Palestinian representative for Foreign 
Affairs and the member states of IBSA during the Brasilia Summit on 15 April 2010 
(Itamaraty bulletin n° 197, 2010; ANBA, 11/04/10, 15/04/10a)
xxxi
. This Dialogue Forum 
had, up to that time, only expressed its will to participate further in this sensitive issue. 
Organizing the meeting aimed to show that emerging nations were from then on ready 
to give a concrete expression of their involvement in the international scene. Traditional 
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partners of the Mediterranean region will most certainly need to count with these new 
political forces. 
Nevertheless, Brazil had not yet organized meetings or officially coordinated 
negotiations between both sides. And yet, it has been often stressed that the personality 
of the Brazilian President Lula had been important for the international visibility of his 
country, particularly his political career (as a union activist under the military 
dictatorship) as well as his negotiator skills (Infolatam, 29/04/10)
xxxii
. A new extremely 
interesting perspective is then opening up, as the attitude of the current Brazilian leader 
will enable an assessment of how long-lasting and durable the diplomatic efforts 
undertaken since 2003 have been. 
 
Conclusion 
Brazilian strategy towards non-European Mediterranean countries seems to bear 
fruit: an increase in trade and an improvement of Brazil‟s international visibility. This 
rapprochement does not necessarily correspond to a foreign policy priority, but it does 
belong to a broader global strategy. Within such a framework, this approximation 
makes sense and reveals its whole importance, along with a certain capacity of 
developing countries to assert their point of view. Brazilian diplomacy is still the 
cornerstone of a strategy aiming to achieve recognition and participation in the 
evolutions of the international scene. 
Here the focus has been placed on the Brazilian outbreak on the Southern and 
Eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, but the fact that other South American states 
have also gotten closer to this region should be highlighted as well. First, the visits of 
Arab, Turkish and Israeli leaders in Brazil always occur within the framework of a 
round trip in Latin America. Moreover, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has also 
developed a strong diplomatic activism, particularly towards the oil exporting countries 
Libya and Algeria. The Bolivarian leader also regularly addresses Israeli-Palestinian 
issues, defending the Palestinian cause more firmly. Argentinean President Cristina 
Kirchner also visited Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in November 2008. Partnerships for 
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non-European Mediterranean countries are broadening and diversifying and Latin 
America participates in that evolution. 
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* I am very thankful to Vanessa Coursol and Adam Stubits for their help. 
i The expression refers to how the Lebanese people sometimes call the Brazilians. 
NB: ANBA is the Arab-Brazilian News Agency, headquarted in São Paulo and launched in 2003.  
ii European refers to EU member states, hence why Turkey in not included. 
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iii Indeed, Brazil was candidate to a permanent seat at the League of Nations. Brazil even retired from the 
organization when other countries refused its candidacy. 
iv The notion of „emergence‟ comes from financial studies before arriving in political sciences. (Goldman 
Sachs, 2003). 
v The commercial G-20 is not to be confused with the financial G-20 created in 1999 and that became 
famous in the wake of the international crisis in 2008. 
vi Other name given to the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations. 
vii http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/ministerio/estrutura/organograma_mre.pdf (20/04/2010). 
viii These figures are not officially confirmed but are the most often quoted. 
ix http://www2.mre.gov.br/dai/bilaterais.htm (10/04/2010). 
x 1940s: Lebanon, Syria, Egypt; 1950s: Iraq, Tunisia, 1960s: Morocco, Algeria, Libya. 
xi Brazil recognized Israel in 1949 and diplomatic exchanges happened only three years later because of 
Brazilian reticence of Israel presence in Jerusalem, less according to Arab states than to the Vatican. 
The 1947 vote is a good example of alignment on the US. Until 1973, Brazil adopted an attitude of 
„equidistance‟ to avoid importing the conflict at home (Santana, 2005). 
xii  See http://www2.mre.gov.br/eventos/marco02.htm (29/04/2010). 
xiii Main visits : 
- 3-10 December 2003: Lula‟s tour to Arab countries: Syria (3-4), Lebanon (4-5), United Arab Emirates 
(Abu Dhabi-6, Dubaï-6-7), Egypt (8-9), Libya (9-10)    
- 16 February 2004: Lebanese President, Emile Lahoud, in Brasilia  
- 25-26 November 2004: Rey of Morocco, Mohammed VI in Brazil 
- 12-13 May 2005: President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Brasilia (ASPA Summit) 
- 8-9 February 2006: visit of President Lula to Algeria 
- 21-23 May 2009: visit of President Lula to Turkey 
- 1
st
 July 2009: trip of President Lula to Libya (African Union Summit) 
- 11-15 November 2009: President of Israel, Shimon Peres in Brazil 
- 24 November 2009: President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas in Brazil 
- 16-18 March 2010: visit of President Lula to the Middle East: Israel (15-16), Palestinian territories (16-
17) et Jordan (17-18) 
- 22 April 2010: President of Lebanon, Michel Sleiman in Brazil 
- 30 June – 2 July 2010: Syrian President, Bachar Al-Assad in Brazil 
xiv Emperor Don Pedro II travelled to Lebanon (private visits) in 1871 and 1876 and President Figueiredo 
to Algeria during the first African tour of a Brazilian head of state. (Majzoub, 2001) 
xv On the whole, Lula has traveled 13 times to Africa between 2003 and 2010. 
xvi A second Summit was held in Doha, Qatar in 2009. 
Israel and Turkey do not participate as it is the Arab League the Mediterranean coordinator. 
xvii Social program that aims at helping the poorest families against some commitments: sending children 





xx http://www.ccab.com.br/site/bc_an_arabes.php (29/04/2010). 
xxi Ibid. Ores follow with 16%. The three of them represent 62% of Brazilian exports. 
xxii Similarly, the intensification of relations with Turkey may be link to similar positions on the Iranian 
issue.  
xxiii Information given to me by Itamaraty. 
xxiv Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the end of the first ASPA Summit, Brasilia, 11 May 2005. 
xxvhttp://www.mre.gov.py/dependencias/tratados/mercosur/registro%20mercosur/mercosurprincipal.htm  
(13/03/2010). 
xxvi Also in 2010, he was not authorized to enter the Gaza Strip. 
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xxvii Mediation group for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is composed of Russia, the EU, the UN and the 
US. 
xxviii IBSA is a group composed by India, Brazil and South Africa aiming at coordinating their positions 
and strengthening their relations. 
The Brazilian government is also very active concerning Lebanon. It participated in the Stockholm 
donators Conference in 2006 and implemented various projects of cooperation. 
xxix For the first time in 40 years, an Israeli President, Shimon Peres, came to Brazil in November 2009. 
He was almost followed by the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, the same month. 
The later has already been in Brazil in May 2005 during the I ASPA Summit. 
In November again Brazil received the Iranian President, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, peak of a very intense 
diplomatic activity. 
xxx Lula‟s travel to the Middle East: Israel (15-16), Palestinian territories (16-17) and Jordan (17-18). 
xxxi In September 2009, the three countries met a joint declaration at the Human rights Council to 
deplore the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In April 2010, the IBSA Fund 
promised to implement new projects in these Territories. 
xxxii Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected the most influential personality of the year by Time. 
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RESUMO 
O Brasil tem desenvolvido uma diplomacia ativa até os chamados países do Sul 
durante os governos de Lula. Os Estados mediterrânicos não europeus também 
receberam atenção por varias razões: históricas, comerciais mas também estratégicas 
como parte do projeto brasileiro de emergência ao nível mundial. Em particular, o 








Brazil under Lula presidency has developed an active diplomacy towards 
developing countries. Non-European Mediterranean states do not escape from the 
Brazilian strategy. This article aims at showing the new dynamism in political and 
economical links between Brazil and that region. Moreover, South-South relations help 
the Brazilian government to express its position on international issues, as this is the 
case for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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